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***NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE***

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



EUROPEAN SECURITY IN AN EVOLVING WORLD

by

Mr. Richard A. Youngs

Defense Intelligence Agency

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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


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
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ABSTRACT

Sweeping changes across the globe are significantly affecting everything from global demography to the geopolitical balance of power. Conventional wisdom and recent history lead one to believe that these changes will leave Europe relatively unscathed. However, the picture is not nearly as simple. The major perturbations occurring across the globe and within Europe today are creating a much different European actor and a much different world in which it must navigate. The democratization or devolution of power from nation-states to a variety of non-state actors, global and regional population trends, and the imminent rise of Asia are just a few of the challenges that Europeans must address over the next several decades. Europe's ability to meet these challenges is neither insurmountable nor imminent. A holistic and unified approach to these challenges through an empowered European Union will assure that Europe remains a strong and stable geopolitical actor in the twenty-first century.

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INTRODUCTION

With the exception of the violent breakup of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, post-World War II Europe is witnessing an unprecedented era of peace. Europe is widely recognized as one of the most secure and stable regions of the early twenty-first century world. Conventional wisdom asserts that this trend will continue unabated for the foreseeable future. Border disputes are almost unheard of and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on threats external to Europe and seeks to develop a stronger relationship with Russia, its former *raison d'être*. In spite of the recent economic crisis, the European Union (EU) reinforces and expands political and economic bonds among its member nations. As an example, European politicians recently agreed on the creation of a “European Stability Mechanism” which will “increase the lending power of a future bailout fund for debt-strapped nations that use the euro.”¹ However, below the surface, there are several factors conspiring that could result in a European continent more reminiscent of a less cohesive and more violent era.

Europeans, like the rest of mankind, are confronted with a world identified by the acceleration of change, in a word: globalization.² According to a 2008 study by the National Intelligence Council, the “international system-as constructed following the

¹ Stephen Castle, “E.U. Finance Ministers Set Terms for New Bailout Fund,” *New York Times*, March 21, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/business/global/22euro.html?scp=2&sq=%22European%20Stability%20Mechanism%22&st=Search> (accessed March 28, 2011).

² Globalization refers to the “degree and intensity with which the world is being tied together into a single globalized marketplace,” as well as “sheer number of people and countries able to partake of this process and affected by it.” “Globalization is built around falling telecommunications costs—thanks to microchips, satellites, fiber optics and the Internet.” Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1999), xv-xvi.

Second World War-will be almost unrecognizable by 2025.”³ Inside Europe, a “perfect storm” of events may prove too much for the continent to handle. A series of global factors, including the democratization of power, global fluctuations in population, and shifts in the global balance of power, will aggravate a number of Euro-centric factors. Included among these factors are demographic factors such as the aging of the European population and the rising numbers of immigrants of distinct cultural backgrounds. This paper will also address the evolving nature of domestic and foreign European politics.

Joint Pub 2.0 refers to the “operational environment” as “the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences” of a given area. Furthermore, it identifies the “military, economic, political, social, information and infrastructure systems as the “relevant aspects of the operational environment,” collectively referred to as PMESII in military jargon.⁴ The combination of the global and European factors occurring simultaneously across the heart of Europe will result in significant changes in the European operational environment across all elements of PMESII. The thesis of this paper is that European nations must take comprehensive action now, individually and collectively, to mitigate the impact of these factors and to remain a stable and relevant geopolitical actor in the twenty-first century.

Chapter one will introduce a number of global factors that are rapidly changing the operational environment of the world today. Many of these changes are primarily outside of Europe; however, this paper will address the impact of these trends on the European environment. According to Joseph Nye, “two great shifts are occurring in this

³ U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence* (June 2007), I-16.

century: a power transition among states and a power diffusion away from all states to non-state actors.”⁵ This chapter will discuss both of these shifts in detail. This paper will refer to Dr. Nye’s concept of “power diffusion away from states” as the “democratization of power.” This “democratization of power” concept will be evaluated across all instruments of national power, defined by joint doctrine as “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military,” and commonly referred to by the acronym DIME.⁶

In addition to the sweeping changes associated with the democratization of power, this section will also identify key global population trends. While demographic projections tend to be an inexact science, there is wide consensus that the major increases in population growth over the next 50 years will occur outside of Europe, with over ninety-five percent of that growth projected to occur in developing countries.⁷ The birth rate in many European countries is now below the rate required to sustain the population, whereas continued population growth is very likely in other regions of the world, notably the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. This section will examine the impacts of the redistribution of the global populace on the existing international order.

Finally, chapter one will address changes in the balance of power among state actors. Whereas Western Europe and the United States established and maintained the political and economic order of the twentieth century, there are clear indications that the twenty-first century will have a more Eastern flavor. This section will address the impact

⁵ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xv.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning* (December 2006), GJI-13.

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010* (February 2010), 12.

an “Asian century” may have on international institutions originally created, and currently led by, the victors of World War II.

In chapter two, the focus will narrow to address key issues affecting Europe directly. The first section will discuss the issue of an aging European population. The so-called “Silver Tsunami” has the potential to cause significant social, political, and economic problems for the various European social welfare states.⁸ Recent protests in London and Paris over increases in college tuition and retirement age are early indicators of the turmoil that may result from the aging of European societies.⁹

This chapter will also address the impact of the rising number of Muslim immigrants to Europe. Migrants who were once thought of as a temporary solution to transitory economic requirements are now firmly entrenched in the European operational environment. Over the long-term, the aging phenomenon makes it highly likely that European leaders will once again look to the Muslim world to supply it with much needed immigrant labor. However, the association of Muslims with terrorism in a post-9/11 world, and populist political tendencies to define Islam as an existential threat to European culture will make this process extremely contentious among Europeans and Muslims alike.

⁸ “The term ‘welfare state’ has typically been applied to countries in which public spending has risen to very high levels in order to finance social programs. How high? There is no hard and fast rule, but the countries that are considered as being welfare states normally have governments whose expenditure is about half of their GDP: indeed in some countries, it has risen as high as 60 percent of GDP. Michael Camdessus, “Worldwide Crisis in the Welfare State: What next in the Context of Globalization?,” (prepared remarks, delivered at a Observatoire Chrétien des Réalités Economiques seminar, Paris, France, October 15, 1998), <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/101598.htm> (accessed March 23, 2011).

⁹ Sarah Lyall, “London Tuition Hike Protests Turn Violent,” *New York Times*, November 10, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/europe/11london.html> (accessed February 28, 2011); Steven Erlanger, “Amid Strikes, French Leader Vows Order,” *New York Times*, October 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/world/europe/20france.html> (accessed February 28, 2011).

Finally, Chapter two will address the key changes, as well as current trends, occurring in the European politics. This section will discuss the political institutional relations of European nations through a discussion of the history and current trends of the two principle elements of Europe's political infrastructure: NATO and the EU. From there, the section will highlight the importance of successful European relations with the key neighboring countries of Russia and Turkey.

Chapter three, the final major section of this paper, will seek to identify the aggregated impact of the changes addressed in the previous two chapters. To do so, this section will individually assess the cumulative impact of the global and European trends across the "relevant aspects of the operational environment," using the PMESII construct previously identified. Finally, the paper will conclude with a short chapter highlighting a series of broad recommendations for European nations to enact in order to mitigate the impact of the events conspiring below the apparent calm surface of European security.

CHAPTER 1: GLOBAL TRENDS

One cannot read a newspaper, watch the news, or visit a bookstore without being bombarded by “experts” espousing the virtues or horrors of globalization. The mere fact that one is just as likely to be reading, watching, or listening to these “experts” online as opposed to having a physical book or newspaper in hand, or watching them on television is itself attributed to the ubiquitous presence of globalization. While the technological aspects of globalization are generally emphasized, the uniqueness and dynamism of the human aspects of globalization are ignored at one’s own peril.

Speaking of another, yet no less relevant, age in international relations, noted historian Arnold Toynbee warned of the propensity of “treating living creatures as though they were inanimate.”¹ While global trends are often viewed as inanimate statistics on a computer screen, it is a significant risk to assume that these statistics are completely static, predictable, or occurring in isolation. This paper argues that global trends underway today are in fact changing the current demographic base of European society. Three key changes in the global environment: the “democratization of power,” global population trends, and changes to the global balance of power, all the result of human actions and reactions to historical and current socio-political conditions, will be discussed in this section.

The “democratization of power, in all realms, poses a significant threat to the presumed inviolability of state sovereignty. Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia

¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Introduction*, vol. 1 of *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 8.

in 1648 this core principle has dominated the entire field of international relations.²

Challenges from international organizations like the United Nations (UN), supranational entities like the European Union (EU), as well as other non-state actors like the ever-growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational terrorist and criminal groups are already undermining the absolute sovereignty that was once the exclusive domain of nation-states.³

Second, global population trends, while always difficult to predict over the long term with absolute certainty, clearly indicate significant changes are underway in the global distribution of mankind. Large population increases are expected in many areas that are least able to support growing populations. On the other hand, many European nations are facing the exact opposite problem in that the birth rates of the native populations are now well below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per couple.⁴ These two factors, combined with the relative ease of global mobility in the twenty-first century may exacerbate the ongoing shift of populations from areas of limited economic and physical security to those secure areas of the world most in need of human labor.

Finally, this chapter will address the changes already underway in the global balance of power. At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the bipolar world they themselves created. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1991, the United States was recognized as the sole global

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 35.

³ U.S. Office of Director of National Intelligence, *Global Governance 2025: A Transformed World*, iv.

⁴ Replacement level fertility is defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as “the number of births per woman required to maintain the population in the long term — approximately 2.1 births per woman.” U.S. Census Bureau, *Population Profile of the United States: 2000* (Internet release), <http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/chap04.pdf> (accessed March 19, 2011).

superpower.⁵ Many Americans, including noted columnist Charles Krauthammer, believed that this “unipolar” moment would be the norm for decades.⁶ However, the twenty-first century appears less and less likely to be a continuation of the American century. While it is not yet clear what will replace American global hegemony, it is apparent that a new balance of power is in the making, and history suggests that these types of shifts in global power are rarely peaceful phenomena.

These three global trends will have a deep and lasting impression on the international system during the first half of the twenty-first century. While discussing these events in a global context, this paper will address the impact of these trends on Europe, and European security concerns, in particular. The world has been dominated by a European-designed, state-based, international order for the better part of the last 500 years. With those days inevitably numbered, Europe must seriously address its path forward if it wishes to play a similar role in the twenty-first century international order.

Democratization of Power

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the most significant changes to international system since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in widespread recognition that liberal democracy and ‘free market’ economics were the global example of successful state models. Francis Fukuyama famously, and controversially, summed up

⁵ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 19.

⁶ “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.” Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no.1, America and the World (1990/1991): 23-24.

this thesis in his 1989 book *The End of History and the Last Man*.⁷ Nation-states quickly attempted to take advantage of the expanding political and economic freedoms present in the new era. However, states were not the only international actors that were looking to extract political and economic advantage from the new international system.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, individuals and organizations effectively expanded their power in relation to that of the nation-state. Prior to September 11, 2001, this trend was most visible in the diplomatic and economic realms, with the expansion in size and power of supranational entities like the European Union, as well as the signing of a number of free trade agreements binding nations and groups of nations closer together. On 9/11, the world also came to recognize that power had also been democratized in the realm of military power. The last several years, led by Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, have witnessed the democratization of the last element of the DIME construct, that being the informational instrument of power. Whereas in previous eras access and control of information was the exclusive realm of governments and powerful media corporations, today any individual with access to the internet can reach the entire world. The combined effect is that all instruments of national power, or DIME as defined by joint doctrine, are increasingly being utilized by non-state actors and individuals often to the detriment of nation-state power.

Democratization of Diplomatic Power

Stephen Krasner, international relations professor at Stanford University and former Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State, concludes

⁷ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xi-xiii. Fukuyama argued that the liberal democratic form of government had conquered all previous forms of political governance and as such represented “the final form of human government.”

that, “the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, is taken to mark the beginning of the modern international system as a universe composed of sovereign states, each with exclusive authority within its own geographic boundaries.”⁸ This widely accepted international relations tenet of nation-state sovereignty guided diplomatic decisions ever since. However, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, the concept of the “exclusive authority” of the nation-state has come under attack. In the latter half of the twentieth century this challenge was most visible in the form of actions of international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and supranational entities like the European Union (EU). Actions by non-state actors at the dawn of the twenty-first century may prove too much of a challenge for this long-standing principle of global diplomacy to endure.

While the UN is the largest international organization of state actors, its charter reinforces the principles of state sovereignty previously discussed. Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter states that “the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”⁹ As such, while the UN is recognized as the world’s largest multinational diplomatic body, it does not supersede the inherent diplomatic powers of its member nations under most situations. It does, however, frequently provide legitimacy to its strongest members to justify actions contrary to the concept of “sovereign equality” mentioned previously. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized members to use “all necessary measures” to “protect civilians” in Libya is only the most

⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995-1996): 115.

⁹ “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,” June 26, 1945, <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf> (accessed November 18, 2010).

recent example of a decision contrary to the “sovereign equality” concept.¹⁰ However, this role falls short of the actions exercised by true supranational actors.

Conversely, the European Union has evolved into a multinational European body, whose political, legal and economic infrastructure supersedes elements of its member nations’ sovereignties, albeit willingly. On the diplomatic side, the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 resulted in several key changes in the way the EU manages foreign affairs. First, the treaty expands the powers of the EU’s foreign minister, whose title changed from the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the HR’s powers “to conduct foreign policy, propose his own budget and name his own staff” have all been enhanced.¹¹ Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon led to the July 26, 2010 decision by the Council of the European Union to establish the EU’s own diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS).¹² Together, the office of the HR and the EEAS provide substantive moves forward in the realm of diplomatic power external to the “exclusive authority” of nation states. However, while supranational organizations like the EU represent challenges to state sovereignty in the diplomatic realm, those nations they primarily affect voluntarily cede elements of their sovereignty. Not so benignly, non-state actors are posing nearly as

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973*, March 17, 2011, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 30, 2011).

¹¹ Andrew Rettman, “EU States Near Agreement on Diplomatic Service,” euobserver.com, October 23, 2009, <http://euobserver.com/9/28878?print=1> (accessed November 13, 2010).

¹² Council of the European Union, *Council Establishes the European External Action Service*, 12589/10, Presse 218 (Brussels, 26 July 2010), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/115960.pdf (accessed 13 November, 2010)

many challenges to traditional state sovereignty, and are doing so largely without the willing participation of those states.

The latest crop of challengers to states' exclusive diplomatic powers poses the greatest threat to the current international order. While the creation and maintenance of supranational entities and their inherent powers is a conscious decision of their member states, multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational terrorist groups and criminal organizations often operate outside the realm of, and frequently in direct competition with, nation states. This democratization of diplomacy is occurring at all levels of human society. It is visible in Google's access to information policies vis-à-vis the Chinese government, the ability of major drug cartels to force the hand of corrupt Mexican politicians, the critical role NGOs often play as unwitting financial facilitators of international terrorism, or the ability of transnational terrorist groups to exert asymmetric influence on the world's major powers. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the once dogmatic principle that state-on-state diplomatic relations define the global order is under attack on multiple fronts.

Democratization of Economic Power

A strong economic foundation is a clear indicator of power. This is true regardless of whether one is discussing nations, companies, or organizations. Without sound financial footing it is nearly impossible to exercise other forms of power. The historical record is well-represented by nations which were strong militarily only to collapse due to cracks in their economic foundation, the Soviet Union being the most recent example of this phenomenon. A fundamental principal of foreign relations is that

“the relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant.”¹³

This is as true today as it has ever been. Not since the seventeenth century and the ascendancy of the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations has the possession of economic power in the hands of non-state actors been so prevalent. As a result, the world’s strongest economic nation-states often find themselves in direct competition with MNCs and illicit organizations that pledge allegiance to no country, but to profit motive alone.

Nowhere is this economic competition more visible to the average American citizen than the ongoing war against drugs. In fiscal year 2010, the federal government allocated \$15 billion dollars to support this effort.¹⁴ In addition to this siphoning off of taxpayers’ dollars, Moises Naim, noted author and former editor-in-chief of *Foreign Policy* magazine, claims that “the economic force of the drug trade defies governments.”¹⁵ Just as economically powerful nations wield the most political power, the same can be said for major drug producing and trafficking organizations.

In Bolivia for example, the coccaleros, or coca growers, are now an extremely important political entity in that nation. President Evo Morales, and his political party MAS, or Movement for Socialism, are largely financed by the coccaleros, who have “a natural convergence of interests with the traffickers who control Bolivia’s main export

¹³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xv.

¹⁴ U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Drug Control Strategy: FY 2010 Budget Summary* (The White House: May 2009). <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/10budget/fy10budget.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2010).

¹⁵ Moises Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy* (New York: Anchor Books: 2005), 82.

industry.”¹⁶ Bolivia is by no means the only place where the power of narcotrafficking organizations intersects with and, at times directs, traditional political power. Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico also provide clear examples where illicit organizations have the economic power to impact the political environment in and beyond national boundaries.¹⁷

At the other end of the spectrum reside MNCs. MNCs are an essential and growing element of the twenty-first century’s international order and global economic landscape. In many places around the world MNCs have a significant ability to shape the actions of local politicians and international relations. Walmart’s 2.1 million employees, for example, make its workforce larger than one-third of the countries in the world. More importantly, Walmart’s \$405 billion dollars in sales in 2010 make it the eighth largest exporter in the world.¹⁸ With economic power like that it is no doubt that many countries are indeed threatened by such large MNCs.

State actors are still the most powerful players on the international stage. However, this was not always the case, nor is it guaranteed to be so in the future. Increasingly non-state actors are leveraging their expanding economic strength to pursue their own policies. As religious groups once directed the actions of states in the seventeenth centuries, MNCs and illicit organizations are displaying an increased propensity to do the same today. While these non-state actors may never dethrone the nation-state, it is certainly within the realm of the probable that some of the largest non-state actors will challenge, and potentially direct, the actions of states. If left unchecked

¹⁶ Ibid., 83.

¹⁷ Ibid., 29.

¹⁸ Walmart Corporate

Website, <http://investors.walmartstores.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112761&p=irol-irhome> (accessed March 26, 2011).

this possibility presents a significant threat to the foundation of the current international order.

Democratization of Military Power

Perhaps the single most inviolable tenant of the Westphalian state system is the idea that the state maintains absolute sovereignty over the use of violence. While there are several historical examples of individuals and organizations challenging this principle, never before have non-state actors posed such a lethal threat to the nation-state and its citizens. Individuals, criminal organizations, and national and transnational terrorist groups possess the ability to kill thousands in single attacks, are likely to make similar attempts in the future, and are making significant efforts to acquire and eventually employ the deadliest weapons available.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, large supplies of major weapon systems were available to the highest bidder. Viktor Bout was frequently the highest bidder.¹⁹ Mr. Bout exponentially expanded the international market for illicit weapons. With profit as the primary motive, Bout used his fleet of military cargo aircraft to put weapons on the ground in some of the most dangerous places in the world. No longer were rogue nations dependent upon their state counterparts to acquire weapons to wage war. While Victor Bout has been arrested, it is a near certainty that other facilitators have filled the supply side of this economic equation no longer guided or limited by national strategies.

¹⁹ "Russian businessman Viktor Bout - currently in custody in Thailand and wanted in the US - is widely regarded as one of the world's leading arms smugglers. A former Soviet officer, he launched into a new career after the fall of the USSR, reportedly selling weapons to countries under UN embargo. Mr. Bout built up his business using military planes left on the airfields of the collapsing Soviet empire in the early 1990s." BBC Profile: Viktor Bout, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7281885.stm>, March 6, 2008, (accessed February 28, 2011).

In a similar vein, Abdul Qadeer Khan was able to provide rogue nations with the knowledge to pursue a nuclear weapons capability for what appear to be his own ideological reasons.²⁰ Khan's actions provided nuclear weapons knowledge to some of the most unpredictable leaders in the world today. While Khan is now in custody, the possibility exists that individuals with access and placement remain willing and able to share that information for a price or ideological convictions. In September 2010, for example, an American physicist who worked at Los Alamos laboratory was indicted when he attempted to strike a deal with undercover FBI agents, who he thought were Venezuelan spies, to help develop a Venezuelan nuclear weapons capability.²¹

In addition to individuals willing to sell their wares and knowledge to the highest bidders, there are also those who are looking to acquire the necessary weapons to advance their own philosophical or economic motives. In a 1998 interview, Osama bin Laden made the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a core element of his jihadist philosophy. In response to reported intentions to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, he declared it a "religious duty" to acquire weapons "for the defense of Muslims."²² Even though Al Qaida (AQ) has apparently failed to acquire such weapons to date, there are no indications that their desire to do so has faltered. While a global

²⁰ "Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed to transferring nuclear technology to Iran and Libya, is regarded as a national hero for helping Pakistan become a nuclear state. Dr Khan played the key role in developing Pakistan's nuclear military capability, which culminated in successful tests in May 1998. Coming shortly after similar tests by India, Dr Khan's work helped seal Pakistan's place as the world's seventh nuclear power and sparked national jubilation. The revelations that he passed on nuclear secrets to other countries shocked and traumatized Pakistan." BBC Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3343621.stm, February 20, 2004, (accessed February 28, 2011).

²¹ William J. Broad, "Couple Accused of Passing Nuclear Arms Secrets," *New York Times*, September 17, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/18/us/18scientist.html> (accessed 6 Dec 2010).

²² Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Conversations with Terror," *Time*, January 11, 1999, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989958-2,00.html> (accessed February 28, 2011).

ideology drives Bin Laden and his followers, pure economic motivation likely drove Mexican drug cartels last summer to resort to the type of car bombs common to Iraq and other war zones, but previously unheard of in Mexico's drug war.²³ Both of these groups represent lethal threats to the nations in which they reside and beyond.

AQ has certainly awakened the world to the military threat posed by non-state actors, most notably on 9/11. This threat continues today and displays a remarkable ability to survive and expand in spite of the efforts of the American government to defeat the terrorist organization. While AQ remains a viable threat, the truly scary scenario that keeps many national security strategists awake at night is the potential that AQ, or some other non state actor, acquires nuclear weapons capabilities. As President Obama has made clear, the United States "can absorb [another] terrorist attack; however, he also added that "a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists" would be "a potential game changer."²⁴

Democratization of Informational Power

In the twentieth century it was generally understood that some combination of military and economic power defined the absolute power that states held. When historians look back on the twenty-first century they may note the transition of the information realm to the most important measurement of a nation's power. Already, many are crediting social media as "the new tool for revolutionaries," and a key

²³ Nicholas Casey, "Gunmen Kill 17 in Mexico," *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704196404575375271206298684.html> (accessed February 28, 2011).

²⁴ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 363.

component to the uprisings currently taking place across the Middle East.²⁵ Access and control of information has always been critical to the security of the state. However, in the cyber age it is likely to be just as critical as the instruments of economic or military power. The challenge for nation-states at the turn of the twenty-first century, however, lies not only in the competition between states over content and access to information, but the ability of non-state actors to compete with nations in the informational realm.

Not long ago states could be fairly certain that the majority of the information their citizens had access to would be under at least a semblance of state control. Today, that dynamic is under attack by the barrage of information tools available to society writ large. The ability of citizens to view and publish reports critical of their own governments, to utilize the information realm to execute flash protests, and finally the ability of a relatively small number of individuals to release hundreds of thousands of classified reports immediately to a worldwide audience, all pose a significant threat to the nation state's former monopoly on the control of even the most sensitive of state secrets.

The most recent battle concerning the democratization of information revolves around the release of hundreds of thousands of classified documents over the internet by the Wikileaks website.²⁶ As witnessed by this massive release of state secrets, Wikileaks represents how little control the traditional state apparatus has over twenty-first century media outlets. No longer can states expect to maintain positive control over their own state secrets. In this specific case, it appears a single disgruntled junior soldier was able

²⁵ *Inside Story*, Al Jazeera, "The Tool for Revolution?," (originally aired February 10, 2011), <http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/02/201121010514154634.html>, (accessed March 8, 2011).

²⁶ Scott Shane and Andrew W. Lehren, "Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy," *New York Times*, November 28, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html> (accessed March 19, 2011).

to provide Wikileaks with the mentioned data. However, while the United States considers prosecution of Wikileaks, the rest of the international community is not nearly as unanimous in its condemnation. Norwegian politician, and Nobel Committee member, Snorre Valen made headlines when he nominated Wikileaks for the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize based upon their contribution to “human rights, democracy and freedom of speech” through their exposure of “(among many other things) corruption, war crimes and torture.”²⁷

While the Department of Justice considers legal action against Wikileaks and some officials, including New York Congressman Pete King, are calling for Wikileaks to be designated a terrorist organization, others have taken a more modest view of the media organization.²⁸ Discussing the impact of the leak during congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the following: “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.”²⁹

While Wikileaks does not meet the threshold to justify designation as a terrorist organization, neither should states ignore the impact it may have on foreign policy. While leaks have occurred in the past, Wikileaks confirms the ability of the internet to lift the veil of state secrecy completely. Snorre Valen suggested that Wikileaks supports public awareness of potential “abuses of power that governments should be held accountable for,” and through the power of the internet this information is “more

²⁷ Snorre Valen, “Why I Have Nominated Wikileaks for the Nobel Peace Prize,” Snorre Valen Blog, entry posted February 2, 2011, <http://www.snorrevalen.no/2011/02/02/why-i-have-nominated-wikileaks-for-the-nobel-peace-prize/> (accessed March 26, 2011).

²⁸ Pete King, “Calls to designate WikiLeaks as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Congressman Pete King’s official website, http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ny03_king/kingsupportsprosecutionofwikileaks.html (accessed 15 December 2011).

²⁹ Robert Gates (DOD News Briefing, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., November 30, 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4728> (accessed December 6, 2010).

accessible, easier to distribute, and more democratic in the sense that virtually anyone with an internet connection can contribute.”³⁰ This fact, in turn, may eventually make such events less common occurrences. The true impact of such unfettered access to sensitive information will probably take years, not weeks, to assess, and probably lies somewhere between the extremes discussed here.

Global Population Trends

As the world population approaches 7 billion people, there are several associated factors that must be addressed through the lens of international relations.³¹ While unfulfilled doomsday population scenarios have been around since at least the seventeenth century, the impact of shifting populations and the second and third order effects have certainly shaped the international political environment. This section examines the aging world population and the changes in the global distribution of population. Each of these factors is directly tied to expected changes in global demographics and has the potential to impact global security.

Global Aging

Most of the historical debate around population has focused on ever-increasing numbers of people and fewer and fewer resources to support those people. Today, however, this fear is no longer the primary population concern. In fact, it now appears that the population boom that has defined modern humanity is projected to be reaching its apex. Most recognized organizations assess a steady growth in population trends until

³⁰ Valen, “Why I Nominated Wikileaks.”

³¹ U.S. Census Bureau, *U.S. and World Population Clocks*, <http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html> (accessed March 19, 2011). As of March 19, 2011 the U.S. Census Bureau estimates the world population to be 6,906,757,040.

about 2050, followed by a leveling off, or in some projections a fall, in global population (see fig. 1.1).³²




Figure 1.1. World population projections (in billions of people)

While absolute increases in global population may be less of a concern in the twenty-first century, a recent UN study described the global aging phenomena as “unprecedented, a process without parallel in the history of humanity” and a profound issue that will have “major consequences and implications for all facets of human life.”³³ A decrease in military age males, an increase in the costs of pensions for the working age population, and the potential of decreased benefits for older citizens are only some of the most obvious consequences. Unfortunately, this issue gets relatively little attention compared to broader population issues, like immigration and overall population growth. Paul Hewitt, director of the Global Aging Initiative at the Center for Strategic and

³² Population Reference Bureau, “Understanding and Using Population Projections,” <http://www.prb.org/Publications/PolicyBriefs/UnderstandingandUsingPopulationProjections.aspx> (accessed February 28, 2011).

³³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Ageing 2009*, (New York, 2009), viii, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPA2009/WPA2009_WorkingPaper.pdf (accessed January 7, 2011).

International Studies, declares that “no challenge will more thoroughly dominate the evolution of global finance, politics, and society during the next half-century.”³⁴

As shown in figure 1.2, the increase in the average age of citizens in the United States and a number of key European nations is projected to increase substantially over the next several decades.³⁵ Changes in society of this magnitude have always been relevant to domestic as well as international relations, and global aging will be no exception. Over the next several decades developed and developing nations will experience this phenomenon to varying degrees and be faced with addressing the associated societal impacts.

³⁴ Paul S. Hewitt, “Global Aging and the Rise of the Developing World,” *The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance* 27, no. 4 (October 2002): 477.

³⁵ Tim Plowman, David Prendergast and Simon Roberts, “From People to Prototypes and Products: Ethnographic Liquidity and the Intel Global Aging Experience Study,” *Intel® Technology Journal* 13, no. 3 (2009). http://www.intel.com/Assets/PDF/Article/Aging_From_People_to_Prototypes_and_Products_article.pdf (accessed March 27, 2011).




Figure 1.2. Percentage of Population Over 65, and Over 80, and Projections

The most fundamental impact of such widespread and accelerated growth of aging populations will be the economic impact upon younger demographic groups who will be charged with supporting the expanding medical and pension requirements of their older counterparts. According to UN reporting, the global potential support ratio (PSR), the number of persons aged 15 to 64 for each person aged 65 years or over has fallen from 12:1 in 1950 to 9:1 in 2009. Furthermore, it is projected to fall further to 4:1 by 2050. The UN projects this number will continue to fall to 4 by 2050.³⁶ This will be a tremendous burden on the youth, and it is unclear they will be willing or able to bear it.

The historical record is full of violent responses to perceived uneven economic burdens levied on particular demographic subsets. Global aging could exacerbate already tense relations between various demographic groups. Accurate predictions are nearly impossible due to the unique nature of this problem. However, Paul Hewitt proposes a possible scenario that foresees “a new Dark Ages in which collapsing welfare states have undermined the global political and financial order and old and young societies view one another with recrimination, suspicion, and ideological hatred.”³⁷ This problem and potential scenario has direct ramifications for Europe which will be addressed more completely in Chapter 2.

Population Distribution

British historian Paul Kennedy contends that “population size by itself is never a reliable indicator of power.”³⁸ This does not mean that population size or shifts in size do not have significant impacts on the existing international order. Samuel Huntington

³⁶ UN, *World Population Ageing 2009*, x.

³⁷ Hewitt, “Global Aging,” 485.

³⁸ Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, 198.

clarifies this nuance when he states that “the numerical expansion of one group generates political, economic, and social pressures on other groups and induces countervailing responses.”³⁹ The twentieth century world was led by nations with relatively small populations due in large part to the advantage in industrial capacity wielded by those states. The impact of globalization in the twenty-first century, in the words of New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman, appears to be resulting in the “flattening” of the world.⁴⁰

The “flattening” of the earth serves to minimize the technological knowledge gap between the world’s most advanced nations and the rest of the world. As a result of this democratization of information, as discussed earlier, small states are less capable of maintaining advantages based on a monopoly of certain technologies. Therefore, the role that population plays in the twenty-first century is once again likely to assume a level of highest importance in the global balance of power calculus. It is important to understand where the major population shifts are now occurring and where they are likely to be over the next several decades.

According to a recent study produced by the U.S. National Intelligence Council, the world population is projected to grow to eight billion people by 2025. It goes on to state that “Asia and Africa will account for most” of that growth, with the “countries of Sub-Saharan Africa projected to add about three hundred fifty million people.” Only,

³⁹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 259.

⁴⁰ Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 8. Outlined in his 2005 book, *The World is Flat*, Thomas Friedman describes the concept as a “leveling” of the “global competitive playing field.” The concept is defined by greater competition and collaboration “in real time with more people on more different kinds of work from more different corners of the planet and on a more equal footing than at any previous time in the history of the world.” He adds that the leveling of the field carries with it the potential to “usher in an amazing era of prosperity, innovation, and collaboration, by companies, communities, and individuals,” but also cautions that it may “draw in and superpower a whole new group of angry, frustrated, and humiliated men and women.”

“less than three percent of the growth will occur in the ‘West’ – Europe, Japan, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.”⁴¹

Over the last half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the world is experiencing a significant shift in population as well as associated economic power to the east. The ramifications of this are difficult to predict. However, the historical record is loaded with examples of these types of shifts in power resulting in both intranational and international violence, for example the resurgence of Soviet and Russian power in the first half of the twentieth century. The history of modern Europe can be viewed as a series of violent battles that determined the balance of power between the major European nations. Since the birth of the Westphalian state system, various western nations have led the world economically, militarily, and culturally. The swelling population numbers now occurring in Asia and Africa threaten to upset what has been the status quo and present a difficult transition period for the nation-state system.

The New Balance of Power

The confluence of the democratization of power with the ongoing global population trends indicates that the world may be at the precipice of another major shift in the balance of power, replacing the latest paradigm which has been in existence since the end of World War II. Determining exactly what a new international balance of power will look like is quite impossible. However, one can look at history and trends in international power to provide some insight and make relatively educated estimates of some likely scenarios.

⁴¹ U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Global Trends 2025*, 19.

This section will first examine what is exactly meant by the term international power, to assist in defining what the power arrangements are likely to look like throughout the twenty-first century. This effort will examine how power has been defined through the ages, take account of recent changes spurred by globalization and demographic shifts examined earlier, and attempt to define the key characteristics that will come to define twenty-first century power.

With a working definition of twenty-first century power in hand, the paper then examines the historical record regarding the power relationships that have defined international relations over the last 500 years. This examination will seek to highlight the impact that previous transitions in power have had on the state actors and the system of international relations as a whole. Furthermore, possible scenarios will be identified to help define what the international order of the twenty-first century may look like.

Power Defined

How does one define power? Is power a fixed quality or is it dynamic? Will twenty-first century power be defined as it was in the twentieth century or is mankind entering a new era, with its own unique definition of power? These are some of the questions this paper will address and attempt to answer in this section. Over two millennia ago Thucydides declared “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”⁴² A more nuanced and contrarian explanation is forwarded by Joseph Nye’s acknowledgement that “power is surprisingly elusive and

⁴² Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 402.

difficult to measure” and “on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-first century...not the ultimate arbiter.”⁴³

As previously mentioned, power will be measured through the four instruments of national power as defined by joint doctrine: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). When looking at these instruments of national power it is important to understand that they can all be wielded as either hard or soft power. This may seem counterintuitive, as one may presume that military power is by its nature hard power, and information is soft power. The reality however, is much more nuanced. Joseph Nye describes hard power as the reliance “on inducements or threats” to get one to do what you want. Soft power, conversely, is action taken to “get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs.”⁴⁴ He further clarifies that soft power is wielded primarily through culture, political values, and foreign policies.⁴⁵

In the latter half of the twentieth century, developed nations realized the importance of balancing the application of hard and soft power through diplomacy. This trend is likely to accelerate in the twenty-first century. Regardless, in the twenty-first century, diplomatic, as well as all other instruments of national power are likely to be “less tangible and less coercive” than in previous eras.⁴⁶ Nation-states that realize this trend, harness the most effective resources at their disposal, and effectively apply diplomatic power without threatening their peers will see greater success in the twenty-first century. Those who default back to take a “harder” approach to the application of

⁴³ Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 3 and 9.

⁴⁴ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

diplomatic power are more likely to encourage national and coalition responses to their out-of-date application of power.

Access to, and management of, information is an ability every nation strives to achieve. However, while the early years of the twenty-first century are marked by unprecedented access to information, the ability of an individual, organization, or even a government to control the information has disappeared just as quickly. The exponential increase in access to information is not always convenient for governments. This is to be expected in states like Iran, where state controlled media recently referred to Facebook and Twitter as Iran's "hidden enemy."⁴⁷ However, the U.S. reaction to Wikileaks shows that liberal governments, which generally support free access to information, also have their limits. All of this leads the student of international power to the realization that while states must continue to utilize the information sphere of power, it is no longer a closed system that states can monopolize and control access to.

E.H. Carr accurately captured the importance of military power, stating that "the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultimate* ratio of power in international relations is war."⁴⁸ Throughout recorded history brute force has frequently been the ultimate arbiter between uncompromising nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously referred to war as a "continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."⁴⁹ The use of physical force, in some form or fashion, has always been a critical element of human interaction. The twentieth century

⁴⁷ Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, "Iran Says Facebook and Twitter Are Country's 'Hidden Enemies'," http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Says_Facebook_And_Twitter_Are_Countrys_Hidden_Enemies/2171343.html (accessed January 9, 2011).

⁴⁸ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated: New York, 1964), 109.

⁴⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

witnessed this phenomenon, resulting in the violent deaths of millions and the development of nuclear technology that presented the possibility of global nuclear war. However, by the end of the last century, most powerful states lost the desire to conquer through force. As a result, it is almost impossible to foresee a situation in the near future where a major nation will engage in a large scale military conflict with a peer.

In an increasingly interconnected world, economic policy and actions in one nation are almost certain to impact many other nations. True nation-state power is now defined first and foremost by the size of its national economy, not by the number of tanks or fighter aircraft a nation possesses. This reality transcends states as well; in fact many multinational companies' budgets are now larger than those of some nation-states. This reality makes it very possible that economic competition and "economic warfare" will be to the twenty-first century what military conflict was to the twentieth century.

Power Relationships

The study of modern international relations is essentially the study of the balance of power relationships between nation-states, particularly over the last 500 years. One simple way to assess these power relationships is through a review of historical examples of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international regimes. However, to do an accurate examination of power it is valuable to first answer two questions posed by prominent Columbia professor Kenneth Waltz: "How should we count poles, and how can we measure power?"⁵⁰

To assist in determining the trends in power relationships and answering the polarity question it is useful to have criteria by which to weigh national power.

⁵⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 128.

According to Professor Waltz, state power is determined by a combination of the following: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”⁵¹ For a state to be a true power, it requires relative dominance in all of these areas. It is interesting, but ultimately not particularly useful to say that in military power the world is unipolar while in economic capability the world is multipolar.⁵² Because of the systemic nature of the international system, all components must be accounted for in order to determine true power, and therefore, the order of existing international power relationships.

There is general consensus that early nineteenth century Europe was multipolar. The Concert of Europe was formalized with the signing of the Treaty of Vienna (1815), eroded during the Crimean War (1854), and extinguished with the onset of World War I. This period established an international order that was a “generally effective attempt by European statesmen to maintain peaceful relations between sovereign states.”⁵³ This political arrangement was founded on four “rules of diplomacy”: 1) conference diplomacy would be used to address crises; 2) only the great powers could sanction territorial changes; 3) “essential members” must be protected and defended; and 4) great powers must not be humiliated.⁵⁴ For a period, the great powers were all content with the established rule set and there was an unprecedented period of peace between the great powers.

⁵¹ Ibid., 131.

⁵² Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 3.

⁵³ Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” *World Politics* 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 160.

⁵⁴ Elrod, “The Concert of Europe,” 163-165.

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Concert of Europe and the two world wars an entirely new system of international order was born. Over the next several decades, with the exception of a few outlier nations, the world was essentially divided into one of two camps, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. So was born the bipolar world. During this period, many feared the extermination of the entire planet in the aftermath of a Soviet-American nuclear exchange, satirically epitomized in the cult comedy classic, *Dr. Strangelove*. In response, ominous-sounding policies, like Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), were proposed to prevent the onset of World War III. In the end, humanity's worst fears were not realized and the Soviet Union collapsed, arguably due more to economic shortcomings than overwhelming U.S. military capabilities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism led to a brief moment in history that recognized the undisputed dominance of a single nation in all matters of power. The United States was the world's sole superpower in an undeniably unipolar world. This unique period in modern history led many to question what was next in a "post Cold-War World."⁵⁵ However, some claim that this set of circumstances no longer exists, and that the last decade confirmed early suspicions that indeed the United States is a power in decline.⁵⁶ The U.S. National Security Strategy itself, while making no effort to put a label on today's international order, does make clear that "more actors exert power and influence today"⁵⁷ than recent history permitted.

⁵⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 102.

⁵⁶ Nye, "Future of American Power," 2.

⁵⁷ U.S. Office of the Executive, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 7-8

Future Power

What indicators do current and historical trends of power relationships give us to determine likely scenarios for the first half of the twenty-first century? In order to make an educated assessment of likely power relationships in the near future it is useful to have a framework from which to work. This thesis will leverage Princeton Professor Robert Gilpin's five "assumptions regarding the behavior of states" to analyze the current geopolitical landscape:

1. An international system is stable (i.e. in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.
2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain).
3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.⁵⁸

Looking at the first two assumptions, early in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to ask if there is a state or a group of states that see it

⁵⁸ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 10-11.

“profitable to attempt to change the system” without incurring unacceptable costs to do so.⁵⁹ Returning to Kenneth Waltz’s discussing of power attributes, one quickly realizes that until the EU can be considered a truly unified “state” actor, the United States and China are in a league of their own when a comprehensive view is taken. The question then remains, would either the United States or China view change in the international system as profitable?

In the case of the United States the answer seems fairly simple. The United States may not be completely satisfied with all aspects of the current international order, however, it realizes that an aggressive move to reestablish a unipolar world would be met with prohibitively high costs. Any future systemic changes in the international order are likely to leave the United States worse off for their effort than the current status quo. The Chinese version of this equation is not nearly as clear. As a result, the interaction of these two great powers over the next several decades will come to define the international relations order in the first half of this century.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a thorough analysis of the most likely future scenario for the U.S.–China relationship. It is though, a worthwhile endeavor to propose several likely possibilities. The first such possibility sees continued verbal sparring over economic and diplomatic policy. However, it is unlikely that this sparring would instigate any major changes in the nature of the international order, nor have a major impact on the lesser powers in the current international order. This scenario is most likely if either China’s tremendous economic growth trends level off sometime in the next five to ten years or China is forced to shift its focus to domestic concerns at the expense of its foreign policy.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 10-11.

The second scenario is best captured by the term “G2,” and sees a strong China together with a strong U.S. leading the world in the twenty-first century. Both American and Chinese analysts have predicted this as a likely and healthy way for the United States and China to address global economic issues cooperatively. Referring to the relationship in early 2007, British historian Niall Ferguson coined the phrase “Chimerica,” highlighting the intertwined nature of the two economies, “the Chinese did the saving, the Americans did the spending.” However, more recently he has called into question the stability of such a relationship between America, “the chronic spender,” and China, “the compulsive saver.”⁶⁰

Niall Ferguson’s dire description leads to the third possible scenario that could unfold over the next several decades, the development of an increasingly antagonistic relationship between the two great powers. Additionally, this situation could be aggravated by an increasingly assertive EU, a theme that will be addressed more fully in Chapter 2. Returning to Professor Gilpin’s assumptions, this would be a scenario where China increasingly seeks to change the international order to maximize its own national interests. Furthermore, as Dr. Gilpin explains, these changes are likely to come in the form of economic, political, and territorial challenges.

Likely Chinese efforts could include increasingly antagonistic economic policies that may threaten the U.S.’s position as the world’s economic leader. Additionally, one would expect to see Chinese political efforts to assert additional influence over the UN and other Bretton Woods’ era elements of the international political order, as well as Chinese efforts to expand the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to exert

⁶⁰ Niall Ferguson, “‘Chimerica’ is Headed for Divorce,” *Newsweek*, August 31, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/14/chimerica-is-headed-for-divorce.html> (accessed April 8, 2011).

more regional political influence.⁶¹ Finally, the scenario sees the likely expansion of Chinese territory, to include the reintegration of Taiwan as well as the expansion into the Russian Far East.

Simultaneously, this scenario would assume an increasingly aggressive expansion of Chinese military capabilities. These Chinese moves, which would likely be seen largely as defensive and necessary within China, would be viewed by some as existential threats to the existing international order. These conflicting perceptions of ongoing actions would likely result in increased instability within the international order and a higher possibility of military conflict between China and the U.S., a scenario that would have dire consequences for many other nations as well.

This concludes the macro examination of global trends that are affecting the stability of the international order today and are likely to continue to do so for the next several decades. The democratization of power between states as well as non-state actors, the ever-fluctuating changes in population and demographics, as well as the possible impacts these trends will have on power relationships are all significant factors to consider in chapter two, which will focus on the impact of these trends upon the European region. While global trends are driving many of the European trends, the

⁶¹ "The Bretton Woods system is commonly understood to refer to the international monetary regime that prevailed from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. Taking its name from the site of the 1944 conference that created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the Bretton Woods system was history's first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern currency relations among sovereign states. In principle, the regime was designed to combine binding legal obligations with multilateral decision-making conducted through an international organization, the IMF, endowed with limited supranational authority. In practice the initial scheme, as well as its subsequent development and ultimate demise, were directly dependent on the preferences and policies of its most powerful member, the United States." Benjamin Cohen, "Bretton Woods System," Benjamin Cohen's University of California Santa Barbara Faculty Page, <http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/inpress/bretton.html> (accessed March 1, 2011).

following chapter will also examine several trends underway in Europe that are unique to the region and its people.

CHAPTER 2: EUROPEAN TRENDS

As the previous chapter examined the global trends affecting the international political order, this chapter focuses specifically on European trends that are likely to have a major impact on the European operational environment, to include all aspects of the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and intelligence (PMESII) systems that make up the region. It is common practice today to preach the virtues of the relative peacefulness the European continent has experienced since the end of World War II. In truth it is almost impossible to fathom a scenario which would lead to a large scale military conflict between any of the major European powers. However, history warns that peace is not the normal state of affairs in the international order.

A quick review of history warns one against rephrasing the old adage that “there has scarcely ever been a period in the world’s history when war seems less likely than it does at present.”¹ These words are particularly ominous as they were uttered not in the last decade, but in 1931, by none other than British parliamentarian, noble laureate, and League of Nations’ devotee Lord Edgar Algernon Robert Cecil.² While all governments and their citizens claim to act on behalf of, and in pursuit of, a peaceful agenda, Kenneth Waltz cautions that “peace is not the only goal of even the most peacefully inclined men or states.”³ For if peace was the *raison d’être* for nation-states, then conflict would never occur, and history books would be replete with the historic surrenders of the ages as

¹ Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, 36.

² Nobelprize.org website, “The Nobel Peace Prize 1937: Robert Cecil, Biography,” http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1937/chelwood-bio.html (accessed 17 Jan 2010).

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 15.

opposed to the historic battles. More precisely, all nations are interested in peace on their terms, and historically political, economic, social, and technological changes have resulted in significant changes in the international political environment.

First, and foremost, there are unprecedented demographic changes occurring in Europe today, for which policy makers have failed to prepare adequately. Global aging is hitting Europe exceptionally hard. This phenomenon is particularly troublesome for Europe, as most of its nations have firmly established social welfare within their borders. This process, combined with an increasingly large percentage of Muslim members of European society who are no longer culturally defining themselves in a traditional European sense, is already presenting problems for national and European Union leaders. A recent Gallup poll revealed that “strong majorities of Muslims--68% in Paris, 85% in Berlin, and 88% in London--say religion is an important part of their lives whereas in the general population “only 23% of French, 36% of British, and 41% of German respondents overall consider religion to be an important part of their lives.”⁴

In addition to the ongoing and future disruptions likely to emanate from internal social changes caused by demographic shifts in age and cultural foundations, Europeans struggle with the ultimate role of two Cold War institutions in their midst--NATO and the EU. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had clearly defined borders and missions throughout the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is continually on the defensive about its very existence when its original *raison d'être*, defense from a Soviet invasion, is no longer viewed by most as a realistic scenario. While NATO searches for meaning the European Union (EU) continues to grow as a

⁴ Gallup, “European Muslims Show No Conflict Between Religious and National Identities,” <http://www.gallup.com/poll/27325/european-muslims-show-con%EF%AC%82%20ict-between-religious-national-identities.aspx> (accessed March 1, 2011).

viable political and economic unit. Arguably, the future of the EU is the future of Europe. This section will argue that the EU's continued evolution will largely determine the role Europe will play in a world that increasingly appears to be dominated by the United States and China.

Finally, Europe is also attempting to find a positive path forward in terms of relations with its two most significant neighbors, Russia and Turkey. Russia, historically the most significant external threat to European stability, remains as much of a "riddle, wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"⁵ to European policymakers today as it did when Churchill coined the popular phrase over seventy years ago. In Turkey, Europe is struggling to advance relations with arguably the most important secular state in the Muslim world, while Turkey is itself attempting to define exactly what its national identity is in the twenty-first century.

European Demographics

The impact of demography, the statistical study of human populations, has a long history. Over two hundred years ago British economist Thomas Malthus, possibly the most well known demographer of all time, famously predicted that population growth was "bound to outrun food production, condemning societies to perpetual misery and starvation."⁶ Malthus' ideas had an everlasting impact on the field of political science. His writings on population growth directly influenced such incredible minds as Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and David Ricardo, as well as a number of government policies built

⁵ Winston Churchill, "We Will Deal in Performances, Not Promises," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 6, no. 2 (November 1939): 12, *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 6, 2011).

⁶ Nicholas Wade, "Why Malthus Was Mistaken," *New York Times*, September 19, 1999, late edition.

around avoiding Malthusian disasters; China's "one-child policy" being only the most notorious.⁷

A decade into the twenty-first century, Malthusian debates remain a mainstay in political science classrooms and the media. A recent newspaper article described the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as "food revolutions of our Malthusian era."⁸ One does not have to look hard to find Malthusian influence in the current debates about the future of Europe either. Today's demographic debates, however, focus more on shifting populations and cultures than the historic warnings of too many people and too little food. The contrast of the aging and declining Judeo-Christian European population with the youthful and expanding Islamic-European population are frequently at the heart of cultural debates in Europe today.

This section delves below the surface to investigate the current reality, apparent trends, and potential impacts of the oft-referenced "sliver tsunami" and "Islamic tidal wave." The meteorological metaphors leave no doubt that these projected demographic changes are seen by some as catastrophic events threatening to upturn modern Europe's cultural foundations. Whether such predictions indeed bear fruit or die on the vine as previous Malthusian predictions have depends to a large extent on the actions undertaken by European policymakers over the next several decades.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Egypt and Tunisia Usher in the New Era of Global Food Revolutions," *London Telegraph*, January 30, 2011, online edition, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8291470/Egypt-and-Tunisia-usher-in-the-new-era-of-global-food-revolutions.html, accessed February 8, 2011.

Recommendations for those policymakers will follow in a subsequent chapter; this chapter will identify the current trends and perceptions, and discusses possible implications for twenty-first century Europe.

The “Silver Tsunami”

The most popular demographic theories tend to be those that predict doom and gloom. Those theories traditionally focus on the dangers of an ever-expanding human population crowding a world unable or unwilling to provide the necessary resources to the world’s underprivileged peoples. The alarmist theories posited by Thomas Malthus and Paul Ehrlich⁹ may be the most well known, but they are by no means alone in defense of their claims. However, the “most certain prediction” of the aging phenomenon occurring today is presenting demographers with a new challenge.¹⁰ In Europe and other parts of the world, the major demographic concern is no longer overpopulation, but a stagnant and aging population.¹¹

There have been amazing leaps in life expectancy over the twentieth century, and Europe has led the world in these advancements. According to one study the average age of Western Europeans in 1900 was approximately 48 years. By 1950 that number had

⁹ Writing in the early 1900s Thomas Malthus predicted human population growth was destined to outpace food production. This theory was updated in the twentieth century when in 1968 Paul Ehrlich published *The Population Bomb*, famously predicting that “in the 1970s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.” Thomas R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (Maryland: Penguin Books, 1970), 70-71; Ehrlich Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1970), 11.

¹⁰ Richard Jackson et al., *The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the twenty-first Century* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 10.

¹¹ Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Demographic Future: What Population Growth - and Decline - Means for the Global Economy,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (November 1, 2010): 54.

jumped to 68 years.¹² Today the U.S. Census Bureau estimates the average life expectancy for Western Europeans to fall somewhere between 78 and 80 years, with almost 18% of the entire population over the age of 65.¹³

Furthermore, according to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, Europe is currently the world's oldest region (see figure 2.1), and by 2040, one in four Europeans is projected to be at least 65, with one in seven over 75 years old.¹⁴ Tremendous leaps in health care, particularly improvements resulting in lowering the infant mortality rate, have propelled this amazing leap in the population of Europe's oldest citizens, and there is no reason to believe the trend will change anytime soon.¹⁵ However, aging populations are only half the equation when one seeks to understand the "natural" causes of a declining European population.

¹² Kevin G. Kinsella, "Changes in Life Expectancy 1900-1990," *The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 55 (1992): 1196S-1202S.

¹³ U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports, P95/09-1, *An Aging World: 2008*, by Kevin Kinsella and Wan He. U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, DC, 2009), 11 and 34.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ U.S. Social Security Administration, "Life Expectancy for Social Security," under "History," <http://www.ssa.gov/history/lifeexpect.html> (accessed 12 February 2011); Eberstadt, "The Demographic Future," 55.

Region	65 years and over	75 years and over	80 years and over
Northern Africa			
2008	4.9	1.6	0.7
2020	6.7	2.2	1.1
2040	12.8	5.0	2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa			
2008	3.0	0.9	0.3
2020	3.3	1.0	0.4
2040	4.2	1.4	0.6
Asia (excluding Near East)			
2008	6.8	2.4	1.1
2020	9.3	3.3	1.7
2040	16.2	6.8	3.7
Near East			
2008	4.6	1.7	0.8
2020	5.7	2.0	1.1
2040	9.9	3.8	2.0
Eastern Europe			
2008	14.5	6.0	3.0
2020	17.3	6.9	4.3
2040	24.4	12.6	7.8
Western Europe			
2008	17.8	8.5	4.9
2020	20.9	10.1	6.2
2040	28.1	15.0	9.3
Latin America/Caribbean			
2008	6.5	2.5	1.2
2020	8.8	3.3	1.8
2040	15.3	6.6	3.7
Northern America			
2008	12.8	6.2	3.8
2020	16.5	6.9	4.0
2040	20.8	11.6	7.3
Oceania			
2008	10.8	4.9	2.9
2020	13.7	5.7	3.3
2040	18.5	9.1	5.5

Figure 2.1. Percent Older Population by Region: 2008-2040.

An aging population though, is ultimately only one half of the population growth equation. Birthrate represents the other half, and can potentially mitigate or exacerbate other demographic factors. A total fertility rate¹⁶ of 2.1 is generally accepted as the

¹⁶ Population Reference Bureau (PRB), "Human Population: Future Growth," <http://www.prb.org/educators/teachersguides/humanpopulation/futuregrowth.aspx?p=1> (accessed February 12, 2011). PBR defines total fertility rate (TFR) as the average number of children a women would have assuming that current age-specific birth rates remain constant throughout her childbearing years (usually considered to be ages 15 to 49).

replacement fertility rate, i.e. the level necessary for a given population to replace itself through reproduction. Europe is now experiencing the dual impact of an aging population and precipitous declines in fertility rates. According to a recent United Nations report, as late as 1980 average European fertility rates were above the 2.1 replacement level, however, by 2005 nearly all European countries were falling well short of the replacement rate.¹⁷

According to the U.S. Census Bureau these changes in fertility rates have been “the most prominent historical factor in population aging.”¹⁸ As a result of such low fertility rates it is likely that populations in several European countries will start to decrease. In fact the U.S. Census Bureau predicts population losses in excess of one million people between 2008 and 2040.¹⁹ Falling fertility rates and an aging population present unique problems that European policy makers are just starting to come to address.

This combination can be very problematic, particularly in Europe, where government-sponsored social welfare is the common state of affairs. As a proportionally larger cohort of older Europeans leave the workforce and live off state pensions and medical care, a decreasing cohort of working age Europeans will be called on to provide support. There are several ways European policymakers are attempting to address this dilemma, none of them easy. For example, last November’s controversial decision by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to raise the retirement age for minimum benefits as

¹⁷ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Fertility Report: 2007*, (New York, 2010), 14.

¹⁸ U.S. Census Bureau, *An Aging World: 2008*, 22.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

well as full pension by two years is one such example.²⁰ The following section will focus on the role immigration may play in fulfilling this labor gap, while highlighting the associated problems that may accompany larger immigrant populations in Europe.

Islamic Immigration

European and Islamic cultures have frequently crossed paths throughout the years. The earliest recorded encounter between Europeans and Muslims occurred in A.D. 711 when “Arabs ventured across the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain. Shortly thereafter, “almost all of the Iberian Peninsula fell relatively quickly to the Arabs.”²¹ Within a few years the *Reconquista* began. The reconquest of lost land by the “Christian Kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula” was a series of battles that began in 718 with the Battle of Covadonga and did not culminate until the fall of Granada and expulsion of the Moors in 1492.²² During this same general period, the Crusades were also occurring. In 1095, the first of many Crusades began when Pope Urban II declared that “Christendom was in danger” and “called upon men of faith to help their brethren expel the Turks from Jerusalem.”²³

²⁰ Steven Erlanger, "France: President Signs Pension Reform Bill," *New York Times*, November 11 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/europe/11briefs-france.html> (accessed March 12, 2011).

²¹ Heribert Busse, *Islam in the World Today: A Handbook of Politics, Religion, Culture, and Society*, eds. Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach (London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 16.

²² “In the Spanish national mythopoeia the battle of Covadonga is remembered as the ‘cradle of the Reconquest.’ Fought in the mountain fastness of the Picos de Europa in northern Spain in 718, just seven years after the Muslim invasion had destroyed the Kingdom of the Visigoths, the battle cannot have amounted to much more than a minor skirmish between a small band of Asturian warriors and the Muslim expeditionary force sent to crush their resistance. But royal and monastic chroniclers later transformed this insignificant encounter into a miraculous victory that marked the beginnings of the Asturian monarchy and its seven century-long campaign to expel the ‘Moors’ and to restore the lost territorial and religious unity of the peninsula.” Carolyn Boyd, “The Second Battle of Covadonga: The Politics of Commemoration in Modern Spain,” *History & Memory* 14, no. 1/2 (Fall 2002): 37; Medieval Times History, “Reconquista (718 - 1492),” <http://www.medievaltimes.info/medieval-wars/reconquista.html>, (accessed March 12, 2011)

²³ Tamim Ansary, *Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes* (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 136.

The enduring effects of these early violent encounters continue to haunt the relationship between Muslims and Europeans in the twenty-first century.

It appears that a similar, if less persistently violent, intersection of cultures, is once again upon us, with many now seeking answers to Europe's "Islamic problem," while others simply play on xenophobic fears of a "Eurabian" future.²⁴ The latest waves of immigration began in the twentieth century, where it was much more a factor of economic supply and demand than the historically violent campaigns over religious domination previously mentioned. In addition to the economic migrants, there were also a number of Muslims seeking asylum.

Recent "reconquest"-like conversations have moved beyond the realm of fringe xenophobic elements of European society to the talking points of European heads of state and mainstream media. Across the continent, European leaders are attempting to address the growing concern their citizens have with the increased presence of Islam and the perceived threat it poses. In response to these concerns, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, recently called for banning "preachers of hate" and called for additional shrewdness in dealing with non-violent, Islamic "gateway" organizations.²⁵

This section addresses the historic presence of Muslims in Europe and identifies the causes of recent waves of Muslim migration. From there, current and projected population numbers will be examined, for in the interpretation of these numbers lays the

²⁴ Michael Radu, *Europe's Ghost: Tolerance, Jihadism and the Crisis in the West* (New Yorker: Encounter Books, 2009), 15; "The concept proposed by some of "an ever-growing Muslim Europe-within-Europe—poor, unassimilated and hostile to the United States." Unknown, "The West and Islam: Tales from Eurabia," *The Economist*, June 22, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/7086222>, (accessed March 12, 2011).

²⁵ David Cameron, (speech, Munich, Germany, February 5, 2011), <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293> (accessed February 13, 2011).

foundation of anxiety currently felt among many European citizens. The possible ramifications of the trends as they relate to the challenges associated with the peaceful integration of Muslims into a twenty-first century Europe will also be addressed here.

To understand Islam in Europe today and its associated challenges, it is first necessary to understand the roots of the current Muslim population. While Muslims represent a significant minority population in many European countries, those populations are by no means a monolithic block. Muslim immigrants came, and continue to come, to Europe for a variety of reasons, and from a variety of nations. With few exceptions, most Muslims in Europe today can trace their roots back to economic and political migrations in the latter half of the twentieth century.

In the aftermath of World War II, massive waves of Muslim immigrants began to arrive in Europe.²⁶ The death and destruction wrought by World War II left Europe with massive reconstruction requirements and manpower shortages that were met in part by these immigrants.²⁷ The family members and descendants of these initial workers make up a large part of the Islamic populations in France and Germany in particular. Elsewhere in Europe, economic migrants were common as well, though not as directly connected to the devastation wrought by war.²⁸ As seems to be the case with most economic immigrants, there was a feeling by both the host nation and the immigrants that their presence would be temporary. This would prove false. In addition to the economic

²⁶ Khalid Duran, "Andalusia's Nostalgia for Progress and Harmonious Heresy," *Middle East Report* 178 (September – October 1992): 20.

²⁷ Christopher Caldwell, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 27.

²⁸ Shirleen T. Hunter, ed., *Islam, Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape* (London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 4-5, 30, 51, 78, 98, 122, 142, 157, 175, 192.

immigrants, there has also been a smaller, more recent, wave of political immigrants seeking asylum within Europe's borders.²⁹

According to a recent Pew study, as of 2010, there are 44.1 million Muslims estimated to be living in Europe, representing approximately "6% of Europe's total population."³⁰ Two-thirds of this total resides within the borders France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore safe to assume that the growth trends and policies that occur in those three critical nations can reasonably be expected to have a major impact on broad European-Muslim relations throughout the region.

Projecting population growth is an inexact science. However, recent studies provide general ideas about what the future of Europe will look like. Those studies do not come anywhere near the numbers necessary to justify the "Eurabia" phobia presented by Bruce Bawer, and other authors. Bawer sees increasing waves of Muslim immigrants and high birth rates resulting in Muslim majorities in several Western European countries "within a couple of generations."³¹ These predictions are not consistent with the Pew Research Center's projections that Muslims will barely break ten percent of the French population by 2030, and only 7.1% and 8.2% in Germany and the UK, respectively (See Figure 2.2).³² Unfortunately for policy implications, facts matter less than perception,

²⁹ British Broadcasting Corporation News, "Asylum Seekers: Europe's Dilemma," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1156406.stm> (accessed March 20, 2011).

³⁰ Pew Research Center, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030*, (Washington, D.C., 2011), 121.

³¹ Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* (New York: Broadway Books, 2006), 33.

³² Pew Research Center, *Global Muslim Population*, 124.

and the perception is that a growing Muslim population represents a threat to European culture.³³

Number of Muslims in Selected Countries

Countries	ESTIMATED MUSLIM POPULATION 2010	ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION THAT IS MUSLIM 2010	PROJECTED MUSLIM POPULATION 2030	PROJECTED PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION THAT IS MUSLIM 2030
Austria	475,000	5.7%	799,000	9.3%
Belgium	638,000	6.0	1,149,000	10.2
Denmark	226,000	4.1	317,000	5.6
Finland	42,000	0.8	105,000	1.9
France	4,704,000	7.5	6,860,000	10.3
Germany	4,119,000	5.0	5,545,000	7.1
Greece	527,000	4.7	772,000	6.9
Ireland	43,000	0.9	125,000	2.2
Italy	1,583,000	2.6	3,199,000	5.4
Luxembourg	11,000	2.3	14,000	2.3
Netherlands	914,000	5.5	1,365,000	7.8
Norway	144,000	3.0	359,000	6.5
Portugal	65,000	0.6	65,000	0.6
Spain	1,021,000	2.3	1,859,000	3.7
Sweden	451,000	4.9	993,000	9.9
Switzerland	433,000	5.7	663,000	8.1
United Kingdom	2,869,000	4.6	5,567,000	8.2
Total for these countries	18,267,000	4.5	29,759,000	7.1

Figure 2.2. Number of Muslims in select European countries.

The combined factors of an aging and declining native European population will increase the likelihood that more Muslims, not less, will find their way to Europe over the next several decades. These new Europeans will fill an expected vacuum in the working age population, providing much needed tax revenue for many European states. While this labor pool will be an economic necessity, it is not clear if it will be socially acceptable. The leaders of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have all expressed

³³ David Sapsted, "UK Poll Finds Profound Anti-Muslim Sentiment," *The National (Abu Dhabi)*, January 15, 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/europe/uk-poll-finds-profound-anti-muslim-sentiment> (accessed February 13, 2011).

concern with the concept of “multiculturalism” in Europe.³⁴ The social implications of the changing demographics and the resultant policy decisions will be discussed further in chapter three.

European Institutional Relations

As much as Europe’s demographic shifts will define its people in the twenty-first century, its political infrastructure will define it as a geopolitical entity. The continued evolution of NATO and the EU will increasingly represent Europe, at home and abroad. Both of these organizations have their historic roots in the aftermath of World War II. Both organizations were shaped by the ensuing Cold War and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. This section will investigate the historical origins and evolution of the EU and NATO, and attempt to define the essential roles these organizations are likely to play over the next several decades.

NATO

As NATO enters the second decade of the twenty-first century there is ample debate as to its future. The first half of this section will describe the initial purpose and missions of post-World War II NATO, followed by the evolution of the organization through the rest of the twentieth century. The second half will focus on recent changes NATO has experienced in the post-Cold War era and where it appears to be heading today. Several pertinent issues about NATO’s future will be addressed, to include its

³⁴ Cort Kirkwood, “Sarkozy Joins Cameron, Merkel, Condemns Multiculturalism,” *New American*, February 14, 2011, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/europe-mainmenu-35/6289-sarkozy-joins-cameron-merkel-condemns-multiculturalism> (accessed February 14, 2011)

policy vis-à-vis a “resurgent Russia,” its “Open Door” stance, as well the type of missions a twenty-first century NATO may be expected to conduct.

The original North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, four years after Germany’s unconditional surrender, and the dawn of the Cold War.³⁵ The original signatories were the United States, Canada, and ten European countries. Written in these tumultuous times, the “greatest threat” was perceived to be “a military attack by a hostile power.”³⁶ This fear played a significant role in the establishment of NATO’s “most famous provision, Article V, which states, ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.’”³⁷

In the latter half of the twentieth century NATO membership and the importance of Article V as the core element of the organization, both grew. The original twelve signatories grew by a mere four nations prior to the end of the Cold War, and the primary focus remained collective defense against Soviet aggression and collective security against internal rivalries.³⁸ However, the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001 created a geopolitical situation where NATO’s principle mission and membership were called into question.

³⁵ “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Homepage*, under official texts, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed February 18, 2011).

³⁶ James M. Goldgeiger, “The Future of NATO,” special report, *Council on Foreign Relations*, no. 51 (February 2010), vii.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, vii.

³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Member Countries,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm (accessed February 19, 2011); Charles A. Kupchan, “NATO’s Final Frontier,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.3 (May 1, 2010): 101.

Over a period of ten years, from 1999-2009, NATO membership grew from sixteen to its present size of twenty-eight nations.³⁹ Without an obvious enemy possessing overwhelming military capability, NATO shifted its efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The new NATO placed higher emphasis on “stabilizing a suddenly unstable geopolitical situation in central and eastern Europe.”⁴⁰ The primary means sought to achieve this desired end was the official incorporation of those states into NATO.

Today, NATO is struggling with three key issues which will determine its course over the next several decades: 1) the level of NATO engagement with Russia; 2) the continued enlargement of NATO membership; and 3) the continued expansion of NATO mission sets, geographically and functionally. Arguments can be made in favor and against each of these three positions. These issues are very complex and beyond the scope of this paper. Ultimately however, their resolution will come to define NATO and go a long way to define the role Europe itself will play in an increasingly complex world.

European Union

While NATO dominated twentieth century European geopolitics, it is a distinct possibility that the EU will assume that role in the twenty-first century. The last century saw the preeminence of hard power dynamics inherent in the Cold War rivalry. Hard power in the twenty-first century is increasingly giving way to soft power and the distribution of that power to non-state actors. In a world where European security may

³⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Member Countries.”

⁴⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 5 (September 2009), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=1851522651&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1301329021&clientId=3921&aid=3> (accessed February 20, 2011).

depend more on effective and efficient economic and social integration than the number of tanks and bombers in the inventory, the EU may be better equipped to address Europe's problems in the twenty-first century.

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, former U.S. Ambassador to the EU, stated that "the EU has been a significant force behind the unification of a historically war-torn continent under a peaceful, legally binding democratic covenant."⁴¹ As much as NATO focused on the development of cooperative defense and security in the last half century, the EU has focused on common economic and diplomatic policy. Additionally, significant steps in the last decade indicate the EU is moving towards a stronger stance on common defense and security as well.

Looking ahead to the role of the EU in the twenty-first century it is helpful to review the latest major treaty adopted by the organization. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009, and with it an understanding that Europe must adjust its political infrastructure to remain competitive and secure in the twenty-first century.⁴² According to the EU's website, the Lisbon Treaty amends the existing treaties to create a more democratic, transparent, and efficient Europe able to play a more critical role on the global stage.⁴³

To a large extent the EU is facing many of the same issues that seem to be troubling NATO in the twenty-first century. Some argue that the answers to both of their

⁴¹ Anthony Luzzatto Gardner and Stuart E. Eizenstat, "New Treaty, New Influence?" *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (March 2010), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=11&did=1976066231&SrchMode=3&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1301329481&clientId=3921&id=4> (accessed February 20, 2011).

⁴² EUROPA, "Treaty of Europe: Taking Europe into the twenty-first Century," http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (accessed February 20, 2011).

⁴³ EUROPA, "Treaty of Europe."

problems may lie in increased cooperation.⁴⁴ With both NATO and the EU now looking far beyond Europe's borders to ensure their own political and economic security, increased cooperation is a near-necessity. In following Clausewitz's maxim that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" it makes intuitive sense that the EU and NATO must aggressively seek enhanced synchronization of their efforts to succeed in the twenty-first century.⁴⁵

European Foreign Relations

Beyond the internal political infrastructure issues that Europe must address, it must also continue to build upon and improve relations with foreign partners. Relations with Russia and Turkey represent two of the most critical issues that Europeans will have to address over the next several decades. A resurgent Russia and associated energy issues will significantly impact the political and economic stability of Europe. No less important, the eventual acceptance or rejection of Turkey into the EU will have serious implications for Europe and the international community. The ability, or lack thereof, to integrate a Muslim nation into the world's strongest economic bloc effectively sends strong messages to those who predict the imminent clash of civilizations.

Russia

No other single nation poses as many problems for a unified European political entity as the Russian Federation. A recent article published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies declared that "in restoring its great power status and rebuilding its zones of influence, Putin's Russia is capable of seriously undermining Western

⁴⁴ Luzatto Gardner, "New Treaty, New Influence?," 5.

⁴⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

interests.”⁴⁶ Ronald Asmus, Strategic Planner at the German Marshall Fund, declared that Russia’s actions during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008 “shook the belief that a democratic and cooperative peace” in Europe “had triumphed.”⁴⁷ Two key issues underlie the increasingly pessimistic view of Russian relations with Europe in the twenty-first century: Russia’s role in their “sphere of influence” and its relationships with European partners.

One of the key factors for Russian action in Georgia was the ongoing effort by NATO, urged by American policymakers, to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine in to the organization. “In Russian eyes this war marked a new policy of rollback and containment—an effort to roll back Western influence and to contain any future expansion of Western institutions to Russia’s borders.”⁴⁸ Georgia and Ukraine have long historic ties to Russia, and it is unrealistic for proponents of NATO expansion to assume that Russia will simply allow the loss of these two countries without at least a symbolic fight. Preventing subsequent Russia-Georgia type scenarios from occurring in the future will require delicate diplomatic moves on the part of European institutions.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin “has been willing to use Russia’s vast energy resources as a foreign policy wedge.”⁴⁹ In addition to energy issues, Russia has exploited the “planned U.S. missile defense shield, the validity of various arms control treaties, and the final status of Kosova” to “drive wedges between EU countries and

⁴⁶ Janusz Bugajski, *Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2008), 8.

⁴⁷ Ronald D. Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 215.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁴⁹ Steven Hill, *Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age* (California: University of California Press, 2010), 216.

between Europe and the United States.”⁵⁰ Russia seeks to develop strong bilateral relationships with the strongest European nations, notably Germany and France. Notably, conversations between the leaders of the three nations over the last year have attempted to formalize Russian relations with the EU.⁵¹

If the EU and the NATO seek to continue the success they have achieved over the last several decades in pursuit of a more peaceful and democratic Europe, they will have no option but to increase cooperation with Moscow significantly. To do so effectively, the Europeans will have to speak to Russia with a single voice, while at the same time not threatening an easily frightened, and still militarily relevant, nation. The solution will likely lie in the increased “interdependence” of Europe’s and Russia’s economies and “pragmatic engagement” on sensitive issues such as further EU and NATO enlargement as well as missile defense projects.⁵² Americans may characterize this approach as “dependence” and “appeasement,” but anything less could lead to a reigniting of Cold War flames, a scenario neither side is interested in reliving.

Turkey

Turkey is a special case in European foreign affairs. It is one of a handful of states that hold membership in one of Europe’s primary institutions and not the other. In Turkey’s case, it is a long-time member of NATO, but remains outside of the EU. A

⁵⁰ Bugajski, “Expanding Eurasia,” 43.

⁵¹ Judy Dempsey, “Russia Wants to Formalize Relations With E.U.,” *New York Times*, October 27, 2101, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/world/europe/18iht-germany.html> (accessed April 21, 2011).

⁵² Hill, “Europe’s Promise,” 219.

“privileged partnership”⁵³ status, if not full EU membership for Turkey, will be economically beneficial as Europe attempts to expand its role as a global actor in the twenty-first century. However, the perceived and real cultural gulf between Turkey and the rest of Europe, the Cyprus issue, and Turkey’s recent moves to the East all appear to be making such a scenario ever more complicated.

In the 1990s, the main concern with Turkey’s accession to the EU was principally a Kurdish-based human rights issue; today, the debate has shifted to largely xenophobic concerns of Muslims taking European jobs and Islam supplanting traditional European culture.⁵⁴ These sentiments are not isolated within the conservative right wing of European voting blocs at this point either. Instead of embracing the Turkish relationship, recent comments by European political leaders have only made the issue more complicated. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently proposed an EU-lite “privileged partnership;” French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s reiterated his anti-accession stance,⁵⁵ and UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s recent comments, will certainly encourage those who seek a culturally pure Europe at the expense of full European integration.⁵⁶

The second major impediment to Turkish accession, and seemingly just as critical, is the Cyprus issue. Major issues between Turkey and Cyprus, an EU member

⁵³ Bill Park, “The EU and Turkey: Bridge or Barrier?,” in *The Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement: Wider Europe, Weaker Europe?*, eds. David Brown and Alistair J.K. Shepherd (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2007), 170.

⁵⁴ Hugh Pope, “Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 89 no. 6 (November/December 2010): 163.

⁵⁵ Unknown, “A Fading European Dream: Will Turkey Ever Join the EU?,” *The Economist*, October 21, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17276372> (accessed March 27, 2011).

⁵⁶ David Cameron, (speech, Munich, Germany, February 5, 2011).

since May 2004, are preventing most forward momentum on Turkey's accession.⁵⁷

Turkey has made failed efforts to remove this obstacle, most notably reversing the "traditional Turkish policy by agreeing to endorse a plan to reunify the island" in 2003. Unfortunately, while the Turkish Cypriots were in favor of unification, Greek Cypriots, the larger of the two groups, were equally opposed.⁵⁸ Until the EU finds a way to lift the "isolation of northern Cyprus," the Turkish half, there is little chance of Turkey taking further political moves to mitigate this issue.⁵⁹

The final major stumbling block, and the most recent addition to the debate, is the idea that Turkey may be "turning" to the east.⁶⁰ Two recent events support the case for such an assessment: Turkey's negotiations, alongside Brazil, with Iran to broker enriched uranium deals and Turkey's involvement in the Gaza-bound Flotilla carrying aid to the Palestinians.⁶¹ However, taken from the Turkish perspective the former was a practical policy decision which was assumed to be supportive of ongoing U.S. efforts to curb Iranian nuclear weapons development. The latter was equally seen as benign and consistent support to the Palestinians, which would have passed largely without notice if the Israeli commandos had not poorly executed the interdiction operation resulting in the deaths of nine people.⁶²

These three issues are effectively blocking the successful integration of Turkey into the European Union today. Over the next several years, Turkey and the EU have to

⁵⁷ Nathalie Tocci, "Unblocking Turkey's EU Accession," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 3(2010): 27.

⁵⁸ Pope, "Pax Ottomana?," 163.

⁵⁹ Tocci, "Unblocking Turkey's EU Accession," 27.

⁶⁰ Unknown, "Is Turkey Turning? Turkey is Rethinking its Place in the World," *The Economist*, June 10, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/16333417> (accessed March 27, 2011).

⁶¹ Pope, "Pax Ottomana?," 168.

⁶² Pope, "Pax Ottomana?," 168; Isabael Kershner, "After Deadly Raid at Sea, Israel Is Sharply Criticized," *New York Times*, June 1, 2010, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501EED7153CF932A35755C0A9669D8863> (accessed March 13, 2011).

find ways to resolve these differences. On the one hand, issues revolving around Cyprus are at least tangible and have clearly defined necessary outcomes. On the other hand, Turkey's "turn to the East" and the xenophobic sentiment spreading throughout Europe may result in a more emotional rejection of accession. European leaders have to move beyond the exploitation of this sentiment, characterized by former U.S. presidential candidate Howard Dean, as "'a bald and shameful political attempt' to recruit far-right voters," and instead opt for language that unifies Europe once and for all.⁶³

This review of Europe and its problems, a decade into the twenty-first century, provides some insight into the challenges European policymakers will encounter in the decades ahead. Europe is faced with many real problems in the twenty-first century. A rapidly aging population and a steadily growing Muslim population pose real challenges that will take concerted government and societal effort to resolve. Fundamental questions about what it means to be a European will likely cause societal strife if left unchecked.

Connected to these underlying societal issues, Europe's global economic and cultural clout are likely to have much less of an impact in a twenty-first century likely to be led by some combination of U.S. and Chinese power sharing. This reality will force Europe to act ever increasingly as a coordinated body if it hopes to compete with these economic powerhouses. To do so, Europeans will have to continue to evolve their Cold War political infrastructure anchored in NATO and the EU. Unless the EU becomes a truly viable economic and political actor on the global stage, this scenario may prove

⁶³Unknown, "If Only It Were That Easy: American Comments About Turkey Betray a Lack of Understanding of the European Union," *The Economist*, June 17, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16377190?story_id=E1_TGPSSTJD (accessed April 21, 2011).

impossible. To make this a reality, it is crucial that Europe first deal with key international problems associated with Russia and Turkey.

This process will be a bumpy ride regardless and in the short-term there will be major impacts on the European operational environment. The following chapter will analyze the changes likely to occur in the European environment through the use of the PMESII construct.

CHAPTER 3: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

The rapidly changing geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century as well as the major demographic and political changes now occurring in Europe are likely to modify the European environment significantly. The first two chapters sought to identify in detail the principal factors driving such changes. Chapter three will take a holistic look at the changes underway and characterize the collective impact such changes will have on the various elements of the European environment. The pertinent impact on the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII) environments will be the framework for such analysis.

Political Environment

The European political environment is likely to exhibit many dramatic changes over the next several decades. These changes will be apparent in the evolution of both domestic and foreign policy. Many of these changes will be in response to the evolving demographic and political infrastructure addressed in the social and infrastructure sections of this chapter. The focus of this section will largely be to discuss the impact on political relations between individual European nations and their relations vis-à-vis Russia and Turkey.

Germany's role over the next several decades is likely to shape the overall European political environment. Twice in the twentieth century Germany drove the continent into deadly confrontation. For the last sixty years, due largely to a divided nation, Germany's power was constrained. Today, "the delicate balance of power established to contain Germany is coming apart," and it is unclear exactly what impact

this dynamic will have on Europe.⁶⁴ Clearly, German interests do not always align with those of the other European nations. This difference of political priorities, between Germany, the economic engine of Europe, and the other European nations, is sure to cause increased political tensions in the near future.⁶⁵ Relations with Russia are one area where this tension could boil over to the detriment of a unified European political front.

Eastern Europeans are, as a whole, extremely cautious of a resurgent Russia reestablishing relations with Western Europe, Germany in particular. On the other hand, Germany sees very real economic benefits in making such a relationship a cornerstone of their foreign policy. This bipolar view of Russia further solidifies the existing gap between “old” and “new” Europe. Such a split of European interests would prove detrimental to Europe as a whole, and should be avoided at all costs.

Besides the issue of Russia, the second major foreign policy challenge that is proving divisive in European politics is the level of acceptable integration with Turkey. Initial efforts to include Turkey as a formal member of the EU began in 2005. However, over the last six years the accession process has encountered several stumbling blocks. In a recent meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, Turkey's EU affairs minister, Egemen Bagis, said “the relations are not at a point desired by Turkey or the European Union.” Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, went on to add that “There is no technical problem, there's a political problem.”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ George Friedman, *The Next Decade: Where We’ve Been...and Where We’re Going* (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 151.

⁶⁵ Unknown, “Europe’s Engine: Why Germany Needs to Change, Both For its Own Sake and For Others Leaders,” *The Economist*, May 11, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15663362?story_id=15663362 (accessed March 13, 2010).

⁶⁶ Unknown, “Turkey Bemoans Lack of Progress on EU Accession Talks,” *Monsters and Critics.com*, April 19,

Unresolved, these political tensions are enough to convince George Friedman, founder and chief executive officer of STRATFOR, to assert that “we have already seen the high-water mark of European integration.”⁶⁷ If the Europeans are unable to resolve these critical political issues, such may be the destiny of Europe.

Military Environment

Two factors have resulted in less reliance upon military power by European nations in the twenty-first century. The first is the lack of a clear aggressor nation to justify spending necessary to make military might a fiscal priority. As a result, subordination of military spending to social spending is now largely accepted as the best way to protect citizens’ rights. These two factors lead some to warn of an increasingly “dysfunctional” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with no clear role in the post-Cold War environment.⁶⁸

With no clear role for NATO and fewer tax dollars likely to be spent on military budgets it would not be unusual for military relations between many European nations and the United States to decrease by the end of the next decade. Significant reductions in U.S. military bases and personnel would be the most visible outcome of such a situation. This would represent a significant change in U.S. strategic presence on the European continent. However, with the end of the Cold War, declining budgets, and no clear threat, the political justification on both sides of the Atlantic to support such military cooperation will appear to be fading.

2011, http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1634006.php/Turkey-bemoans-lack-of-progress-on-EU-accession-talks (accessed April 23, 2011).

⁶⁷ Friedman, *The Next Decade*, 155.

⁶⁸ Sarwar Kashmiri, “Save NATO, Merge it with CSDP,” *Atlantic Council*, October 26, 2010, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/save-nato-merge-it-csdp (accessed March 5, 2011).

Economic Environment

Europe's economy, measured in gross domestic product (GDP) as a percentage of the world's GDP, is steadily decreasing. According to a U.S. Government assessment, the EU's GDP represented over one-third of the global total as late as 1992, while today it has dropped to approximately twenty eight percent.⁶⁹ There is little reason to believe this trend will change anytime soon. However, this is not a universal trend. Germany, as previously mentioned, weathered the 2008 financial crisis, and appears to be on solid economic ground. This reality "underscored just how far Europe was from being a single country."⁷⁰ There is a wide gulf between the economies of Germany and those of Greece and Ireland, for example. Germany was economically powerful enough to bail out the collapsed economy in Greece, for example, but did so reluctantly.⁷¹

The combined strength of Germany and its unenthusiastic response to the economic problems of fellow European states sent a strong message to the rest of Europe. Possible reactions to such a strong and reluctant German economy will have significant second and third order effects. Economic ties between Germany, France, and increasingly Russia may define the economic core of Europe. This will leave many nations feeling very uncomfortable with their own economic position and possibly lead to the departure of some nations from the Euro zone.

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics, Research Service, "GDP Shares by Country and Region Historical," under "International Macroeconomic Data Set," <http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/> (accessed March 28, 2011).

⁷⁰ George Friedman, *The Next Decade*, 151.

⁷¹ Katrin Bennhold, "In Greek Debt Crisis, a Window to the German Psyche," *New York Times*, March 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/global/04iht-euro.html?scp=1&sq=germany%20greece%20economic%20crises&st=cse> (accessed March 28, 2011).

Social Environment

The first signs of significant social tension on the European continent were exposed in the last several years. A combination of the demographic factors with a declining economy may forecast significant widespread social strife in the years ahead. The previously referenced pronouncements by several European leaders denouncing multiculturalism will do little to ease the concerns of Europeans or new immigrants. The fear mongering vitriol from the likes of Dutch politician Geert Wilders significantly increases the likelihood that these tensions will result in more, not less, violence over the next several years.⁷²

Regardless, the reality over the next several decades will be a very different European social makeup. An aged population will dominate the European landscape. This social reality will affect every other aspect of European life, and may prove to be the single most relevant issue Europe will have to address in the years ahead. Besides the aging of the European population, there is clear evidence that the percentage of European Muslims will grow in comparison to the “native” European population. While this will not result in a “Eurabia” it will increase social tensions that many European governments are proving incapable of addressing adequately.

⁷² BBC News Europe, “Profile: Geert Wilders,” September 30, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11443211> (accessed March 13, 2011). Geert Wilders is a Dutch politician being prosecuted for hate speech over his campaign against Islam in public life. He has called for a ban on the Koran, which he likened to Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. He was voted politician of the year in 2007 by the Dutch political press. His Freedom Party went from winning nine seats in the 2006 election to 24 in 2010, taking a bigger share of the vote than the Christian Democrats - the main party in the outgoing coalition.

Information Environment

The global trend of increased access to information will also occur in Europe. However, with the exception of some of the Eastern European states, Europeans have been at the leading edge of this trend, and as a whole have relatively little with which to be concerned.

Additionally, the ability to share information rapidly between people via social networking sites will increase the likelihood that individuals frustrated with the status quo will assemble quickly. This ability to assemble quickly might then increase the ability of the public to shape the actions and policies of the government in the other spheres of PMESII mentioned in this chapter. It is unclear to date if such public democracy is a more efficient way of addressing the concerns of the entire population or simply responds to the increasingly well-organized “squeaky wheel.”

Political Infrastructure Environment

The geopolitical infrastructure most important in the European security environment during the twentieth century was NATO. The EU is only recently becoming an equally relevant political organization, particularly since 1991 with the introduction of the Euro common monetary unit. More recently, the EU has attempted to expand its foreign policy capabilities and develop an organizational structure to be able to handle twenty-first century problems. Unfortunately, while many argue that NATO has outlived its usefulness as a political organization, it is not clear that Europeans are prepared to enable the EU to fill this role.

A continued emphasis on the twentieth century issues that shaped its continental security concerns continues to derail the ultimate integration of the EU as a fully-

empowered supranational organization. If Europeans cannot manage this process over the next several decades, it is more and more likely that the most powerful European nations, Germany in particular, will seek additional relationships to advance their own geopolitical position at the expense of European unity. Such a trend has proven disastrous for Europe in the past and there is reason to believe that Europe would be worse off in the twenty-first century if the process of integration that defined the twentieth century does not continue in the current era.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis identified the significant factors impacting Europe today and likely to affect the region over the next several decades. The consequences of these factors presented in the last chapter leave a bleak picture for the future of Europe. However, there is reason to doubt predictions that we are witnessing “the last days of Europe.”⁷³ Significant focus in three essential areas: social, economic, and political, may help move Europe out of such a dangerous scenario and solidify the region as a stable economic and political powerhouse for the twenty-first century.

Social, economic, and political issues currently threaten the relevance of twenty-first century Europe. It is critical that Europeans immediately address these three areas with every element of national and supranational power at their disposal to do so. These changes will be most effectively implemented through a strengthened European Union (EU) that eventually acts as *the* strongest single European actor in the realms of domestic and foreign policy. To some Europeans, ongoing changes in the social realm threaten the very meaning of what it is to be European. Individually, the nations of Europe will have limited power in comparison to China, the United States, and a number of rising nations. This mentality has to be addressed holistically and modified. European nations must increasingly act in a cooperative manner if they hope to compete in the economic realm with China and the United States in the twenty-first century. Finally, in the political realm, Europe must also seek to act as a unified actor. This will require moving beyond twentieth century political issues that prevent the maximization of unified European political power.

⁷³ Walter Laquer, *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007), 8.

Socially, European politicians must immediately end the rhetoric that fuels the current wave of Islamaphobia casting its shadow over Europe. The threat associated with Islamic terrorism has been greatly exaggerated in the public arena and the second order effects have led to a significant degradation of relations between native Europeans, new Muslim immigrants, and Turkey. Political leaders have the ability to change the conversation. However, up to this point European leaders have allowed the hyperbolic speech of the dangers of Islam to damage Europe's social fabric for too long.

The EU is a powerful economic entity already. The major problem to date has been the relatively limited role it has played. To maximize Europe's economic potential and to prevent a gradual reversion of EU economic policy, European nations must continue to strive towards increased economic integration. To improve the situation significantly, it will be necessary to enhance economic ties with Turkey and Russia. Europeans should aggressively seek to overcome political issues, most notably the Cyprus issue, which currently prevents Turkey's admission. Preferential economic agreements between EU member nations and Russian and Turkey will be a controversial subject for a number of nations, but such pacts represent the best way to ensure the economic viability of Europe in the twenty-first century.

Finally, for Europe to achieve the political power it wielded in centuries past, unification is also the key. Significant advances were recently made in Lisbon to expand the EU's power as a foreign policy body with real international clout. However, these efforts must be further expanded. Europeans would be well served in the political realm if they could expand and enhance the role of a unified Europe through the utilization of the EU. NATO served a viable purpose in the Cold War. However, the value of such a

military alliance is not nearly as clear in the absence of a clear and present danger from an aggressor state in the decades that follow. Instead, a shift towards an all encompassing unification under the EU may prove more valuable as Europe would be able to focus more on its economic and political well-being without diverting necessary resources to military spending. In this type of scenario NATO could potentially play a supporting role to the EU or more likely cede this role entirely to an EU military element.

The United States and Great Britain will likely take great exception to many of the recommendations made here. This resistance will make the necessary choices even more difficult to achieve. However, in a world where there is little to no near term possibility of a major war in Europe, the primary concern of European leaders should be to unify the region economically, socially, and politically. This unification will help to overcome the social tensions affecting Europe today and make Europe a much more relevant economic and political competitor in the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

This paper addressed the conventional wisdom that Europe is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, a stable region in the international arena. Through the identification of major changes in the world today, as well as changes specific to the European environment, the paper established that the foundation upon which European security and stability currently rest is under significant pressure. Three key global trends as well as two regionally specific factors were addressed in detail to make the case.

On the global stage, the paper argued that the democratization of power, significant changes in the distribution of the world's population, as well as shifts in the post-World War II balance of power equation all represent a major threat to the stability of the international order. The democratization of power away from traditional state actors into the hands of supranational organizations, as well as non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, drug cartels, and terrorists represent the most significant usurpation of state power seen in the Westphalian era. Combined, these groups have effectively eroded the power of the state across the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and economic power. While the state remains the most powerful actor in the international arena today, its continued degradation by supranational and non-state actors presents a significant threat to today's state-led international order.

In addition to the proliferation of challengers to traditional state authority there is a wide divergence in the pace of global population growth. Throughout Asia and Africa, the trends indicate continued growth over the next several decades. In Europe and other

advanced post-industrial societies, population growth has significantly decreased. The birth rates in Europe, for example, are no longer sufficient to reproduce the existing population. This dynamic is likely to produce labor shortages and potentially increase already tense relations across generational lines. These tensions are also likely to expand to the cultural arena as Europeans will be forced to accept government policies to continue, and possibly, accelerate the inflow of economic immigrants, largely from Islamic North Africa. Current events in Europe indicate this challenge will be an increasingly contentious issue for European policymakers.

The third major trend affecting the global arena discussed in this paper is the significant shift in balance of power politics occurring between states themselves. To a large extent the winners of World War II developed and managed the international system for the past sixty years. However, as China and other non-Western nations are able to match European economic might, the possibility increases that the international political infrastructure developed in the post-World War II era will no longer be accepted as the only way to maintain international order. The evolution of the China-U.S. relationship over the next several decades will determine to a large extent the significance of the changes to the international order.

Besides the broad trends occurring across the world, two trends specific to Europe also threaten regional stability. First, the demographic changes occurring in Europe present a significant threat to Europe's social fabric. Policymakers must quickly find a way to attract the labor pool necessary to support an aging European population and simultaneously contain the xenophobic sentiment spreading throughout Europe. The

current coexistence of these two trends is not a long-term possibility, and presents a significant internal threat to European security.

Finally, the paper addressed European political relations, both internal political infrastructure and the importance of evolving relations with key partners. Internally, the case was made for an increased role by the European Union to address European foreign affairs comprehensively and act as a unified global actor on par with the United States or China. The second aspect of this discussion was the need for Europeans to find political solutions to improving relations with both Turkey and Russia. Successfully integrating these two nations into the economic fabric of Europe is the long-term solution to maintaining European global economic relevance.

Europe today is at a crossroads. The international political order it helped establish at the end of World War II is eroding before the eyes of citizens and politicians in Paris, London, Berlin, and throughout Europe. Current trends paint a potentially bleak picture for continued European dominance. However, comprehensive actions now, individually and collectively, present a possible path forward for a stable and relevant twenty-first century Europe.

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